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Abstract
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in an envi-
ronment where market participants play a coordination game with information heterogeneity.
We consider defense policies against speculative currency attacks in a model where speculators
observe the fundamentals with idiosyncratic noise. The policy maker is willing to take a costly
policy action only for moderate fundamentals. Market participants can use this information to
coordinate on different responses to the same policy action, thus resulting in policy traps, where
the devaluation outcome and the shape of the optimal policy are dictated by self-fulfilling mar-
ket expectations. Despite equilibrium multiplicity, robust policy predictions can be made. The
probability of devaluation is monotonic in the fundamentals, the policy maker adopts a costly
defense measure only for a small region of moderate fundamentals, and this region shrinks as
the information in the market becomes precise.
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G.M. Angeletos, C. Hellvvig and A. Pavan
As Mr. Greenspan prepares to give a critical new assessment of the monetary policy
outlook in testimony to Congress on Wednesday, the central bank faces a difficult choice
in grappling with the economic slowdown. If it heeds the clamour from much of Wall
Street and cuts rates now ... it risks being seen as panicky, jeopardizing its reputation for
policy-making competence. But if it waits until March 20, it risks allowing the economy
to develop even more powerful downward momentum in what could prove a crucial three
weeks. (Financial Times, February 27, 2001)
1 Introduction
Economic news anxiously concentrate on the information that different policy choices convey about,
the intentions of the policy maker and the underlying economic fundamentals, how markets may
interpret and react to different policy measures, and whether government intervention can calm
down animal spirits and ease markets to coordinate on desirable courses of actions. This paper
investigates the ability of a policy maker to influence market expectations and control equilibrium
outcomes in environments where market participants play a coordination game with information
heterogeneity.
A large number of economic interactions are characterized by strategic complementarities, can
be modeled as coordination games, and often exhibit multiple equilibria sustained by self-fulfilling
expectations. Prominent examples include self-fulfilling bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983),
debt crises (Calvo, 1988; Cole and Kehoe, 1996), financial crashes (Freixas and Rochet, 1997;
Chari and Kehoe, 2003a,b), and currency crises (Flood and Garber, 1984; Obstfeld, 1986, 1996). J
Building on the global-games work of Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998,
2000) have recently argued that equilibrium multiplicity in such coordination environments is merely
"the unintended consequence" of assuming common knowledge of the fundamentals of the game,
which implies that agents can perfectly forecast each others' beliefs and actions in equilibrium.
When instead different agents have different private information about the fundamentals, players
Strategic complementarities arise also in economies with restricted market participation (Azariadis, 1981), pro-
duction externalities (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Bryant. 1983), demand spillovers (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny,
1989), thick-market externalities (Diamond, 1982), credit constraints (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997), incomplete risk sharing (Angeletos and Calvet, 2003) and imperfect product market competition (Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1990; Vives 1999). The reader can refer to Cooper (1999) for an overview of coordination games
in macroeconomics.
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are uncertain about others' beliefs and actions, and thus perfect coordination is no longer possible.
Iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies then eliminates all but one equilibrium outcome
and one system of beliefs.
This argument has been elegantly illustrated by Morris and Shin (1998) in the context of cur-
rency crises. When it is common knowledge that a currency is sound but vulnerable to a large
speculative attack, two equilibria coexist: One in which all speculators anticipate a crisis, attack
the currency and cause a devaluation, which in turn confirms their expectations; another in which
speculators refrain from attacking, hence vindicating their beliefs that the currency is not in dan-
ger. On the contrary, a unique equilibrium survives when speculators receive noisy idiosyncratic
signals about the willingness and ability of the monetary authority to defend the currency against a
speculative attack (the fundamentals). Devaluation then occurs if and only if the fundamentals fall
below a critical state. This unique threshold in turn depends on all financial and policy variables
affecting the payoffs of the speculators. Morris and Shin hence argue that, "in contrast to multiple
equilibrium models, [their] model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency
attacks." For example, raising domestic interest rates, imposing capital controls, or otherwise in-
creasing the opportunity cost of attacking the currency, reduces the set of fundamentals for which
devaluation occurs.
However, when the fundamentals are so weak that the collapse of the currency is inevitable,
there is no point in raising domestic interest rates or adopting other costly defense measures.
Similarly, when the fundamentals are so strong that the size of the attack is minuscule and the
currency faces no threat, there is no need to intervene. Therefore, whenever the bank raises the
interest rate, the market can infer that the fundamentals are neither too weak nor too strong. This
information in turn may permit coordination in the market on multiple courses of action, thus
interfering with the ability of the policy maker to fashion equilibrium outcomes.
In this paper, we analyze endogenous policy in a global coordination game. To settle in a
particular environment, we add a first stage to the speculative currency attacks model of Morris
and Shin (1998). The central bank moves first, setting the domestic interest rate. Speculators
move second, taking a position in the exchange rate market on the basis of their idiosyncratic noisy
signals about the fundamentals, as well as their observation of the interest rate set by the central
bank. Finally, the bank observes the fraction of speculators attacking the currency and decides
whether to defend the currency or devalue.
"See Morris and Shin (2001) for an extensive overview of this literature. Earlier uniqueness results are in Postle-
waite and Vives (1987) and Chamley (1999).
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The main result of the paper (Theorem 1) establishes that the endogeneity of the policy leads
to multiple equilibrium policies and multiple devaluation outcomes, even when the fundamentals
are observed with idiosyncratic noise. Different equilibria are sustained by different modes of
coordination in the reaction of the market to the same policy choice. Let 9 denote the fundamentals
and r the interest rate. As long as the value of defending the peg is increasing with 6 and the size
(or the cost) of an attack is decreasing with 9, the central bank is willing to incur the cost of a high
interest rate in order to defend the currency only for intermediate values of 9. The observation of an
increase in the interest rate thus signals that the fundamentals are neither too low nor too high, in
which case multiple courses of action may be sustained in the market, creating different incentives for
the policy maker. If speculators coordinate on the same response to any level of the policy, the bank
never finds it optimal to raise the interest rate. Hence, there exists an inactive policy equilibrium,
in which the bank sets the same low interest rate r for all 9 and speculators play the Morris-Shin
continuation equilibrium in the foreign exchange market. If instead speculators coordinate on a
lenient continuation equilibrium (not attacking the currency) when the bank raises the interest
rate sufficiently high, and otherwise play an aggressive continuation equilibrium (attacking the
currency for sufficiently low private signals), the bank finds it optimal to raise the interest rate
for an intermediate range of fundamentals. Hence, there also exists a continuum, of active-policy
equilibria, in which the bank sets a high interest rate r* > r for 9
€
[9*, 9**}, and devaluation occurs
if and only if 9 < 9* . Which equilibrium is played, how high is the rate r* the bank needs to set in
order to be spared from an attack, and what is the threshold 9* below which devaluation occurs,
are all determined by self-fulfilling market expectations. This result thus manifests a kind of policy
traps: In her attempt to fashion the equilibrium outcome, the policy maker reveals information that
market participants can use to coordinate on multiple courses of action, and finds herself trapped in
a position where both the effectiveness of any particular policy choice and the shape of the optimal
policy are dictated by arbitrary market sentiments.
The second result of the paper (Theorem 2) establishes that information heterogeneity sig-
nificantly reduces the equilibrium set as compared to common knowledge and enables meaningful
policy predictions despite the existence of multiple equilibria. In all robust equilibria, the probabil-
ity of devaluation is monotonic in the fundamentals, the policy maker is "anxious to prove herself
by raising the interest rate only for a small region of moderate fundamentals, and the "anxiety
region" vanishes as the information in the market becomes precise. None of these predictions could
be made if the fundamentals were common knowledge.
In the benchmark model, the policy maker faces no uncertainty about the aggressiveness of
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market expectations and the effectiveness of any particular policy choice. We relax this assumption
in Section 5 by introducing sunspots on which speculators may condition their response to the policy.
The same equilibrium interest rate may now lead to different devaluation outcomes. These results
thus reconcile the fact documented by Kraay (2003) and others that raising interest rates does
not systematically affect the outcome of a speculative attack - a fact that prima facie contradicts
the policy prediction of Morris and Shin (f998). Moreover, these results help make sense of the
Financial Times quote: The market may be equally likely to "interpret" a costly policy intervention
either as a signal of strength, in which case the most desirable outcome may be attained, or as a
signal of panic, in which case the policy maker's attempt to coordinate the market on the preferable
course of action proves to be in vain.
On a more theoretical ground, this paper represents a first attempt to introduce signaling in
global coordination games. The receivers (speculators) use the signal (policy) as a coordination
device to switch between lenient and aggressive continuation equilibria in the global coordination
game, thus creating different incentives for the sender (policy maker) and resulting in different
equilibria in the policy game (policy traps). Our multiplicity result is thus different from the
multiplicity result in standard signaling games. It is sustained by different modes of coordination,
not by different systems of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and it survives standard forward induction
refinements, such as the intuitive criterion test of Cho and Kreps (1987). The multiplicity result in
this paper is also different from the multiplicity that arises in standard global coordination games
with exogenous public signals (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001; Hellwig, 2002). In our environment,
the informational content of the public signal (the policy) is endogenous and it is itself the result
of the self-fulfilling expectations of the market. Most importantly, our policy-traps result is not
merely about the possibility of multiple continuation equilibria in the coordination game given any
realization of the policy; it is rather about how endogenous coordination in the market makes the
effectiveness of the policy depend on arbitrary market sentiments and leads to multiple equilibria
in the policy game.
Finally, our policy traps are different from the expectation traps that arise in Kydland-Prescott-
Barro-Gordon environments (e.g., Obstfeld, 1986, 1996; Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1998;
Albanesi, Chari and Christiano, 2002). In these works, multiple equilibria originate in the govern-
ment's lack of commitment and would disappear if the policy maker could commit to a fixed policy
rule. In our work, instead, equilibrium multiplicity originates in endogenous coordination and is
orthogonal to the commitment problem; what is more, despite the risk of falling into a policy trap,
the government need not have any incentive ex ante to commit to a particular interest rate.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and the equilibrium
concept. Section 3 analyzes equilibria in the absence of uncertainty over the aggressiveness of
market expectations. Section 4 examines to what extent meaningful and robust policy predictions
can be made despite the presence of multiple equilibria. Section 5 introduces sunspots to examine
equilibria in which the policy maker faces uncertainty over market reactions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Description
The economy is populated by a continuum of speculators (market participants) of measure one,
indexed by i and uniformly distributed over the [0. 1] interval. Each speculator is endowed with
one unit of wealth denominated in domestic currency, which he may either invest in a domestic
asset or convert to foreign currency and invest it in a foreign asset. In addition, there is a central
banker (the policy maker), who controls the domestic interest rate and seeks to maintain a fixed
peg, or some kind of managed exchange-rate system. 3 We let 9 G © parametrize the cost and
benefits the bank associates with maintaining the peg, or equivalently her willingness and ability
to defend the currency against a potential speculative attack. 9 is private information to the bank
and corresponds to what Morris and Shin (1998) refer to as "the fundamentals." For simplicity, we
let G = M. and the common prior shared by the speculators be a degenerate uniform.''
The game has three stages. In stage 1, the central banker learns the value of maintaining the
peg 9 and fixes the domestic interest rate r £ 7Z = [r,r]. In stage 2, speculators choose their
portfolios after observing the interest rate r set by the central bank and after receiving private
signals x, = 9 + e£, about 9. The scalar e 6 (0, oc) parametrizes the precision of the speculators'
private information about 9 and £{ is noise, i.i.d. across speculators and independent of 9, with
absolutely continuous c.d.f. \I/ and density tp strictly positive and continuously differentiable over
the entire real line (unbounded hill support) or a closed interval [— l.+l] (bounded support).
We adopt the convention of using female pronouns for the centra] banker and masculine pronouns for the specu-
lators.
That the fundamentals of the economy coincide here with the type of the central bank is clearly just a simpli-
fication. Our results remain true if one reinterprets 9 as the policy maker's perception of the fundamentals of the
economy, and x, as the signal speculator i receives about the information of the policy maker. Also, our results hold
for any interval C R and any strictly positive and continuous density over 0, provided that the game remains
"global." We refer to Morris and Shin (2001) for a discussion of the role of degenerate uniform and general common
priors in global coordination games.
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Finally, in stage 3, the central bank observes the aggregate demand for the foreign currency and
decides whether to maintain the peg. Note that stages 2 and 3 of our model correspond to the
global speculative game of Morris and Shin (1998); our model reduces to theirs if r is exogenously
fixed. On the other hand, if the fundamentals were common knowledge (e = 0), stages 2 and 3
would correspond to the speculative game examined by Obstfeld (1986, 1996).
We normalize the foreign interest rate to zero and let the pay-off for a speculator be
u(r, di,D) — (l- a,i)r + a rDir,
where a^ G [0, 1] is the fraction of his wealth converted to foreign currency (equivalently, the
probability that he attacks the peg), ty > is the devaluation premium, and D is the probability
the peg is abandoned. That is, a speculator who does not to attack (a, = 0) enjoys r with
certainty, whereas a speculator who attacks the peg (a^ = 1) earns tt if the peg is abandoned and
zero otherwise.
We denote with a the aggregate demand for the foreign currency (equivalently, the measure of
speculators who attack the peg) and let the payoff for the central bank be
U{r, a, D, 9) = (I- D)V{9, a) - C{r).
V(9
:
a) is the net value of defending the currency against an attack of size a and C(r) the cost of
raising the domestic interest rate at level r. V is increasing in 9 and decreasing in a, C is increasing
in r, and both V and C are continuous. 5
Let 9 and 9 be defined by V(9,0) = V(9, 1) = 0. For 9 < 9 it is dominant for the bank to
devalue, whereas for 9 > 9 it is dominant to maintain the peg. The interval [#, 9] thus represents the
"critical range" of 9 for which the peg is sound but vulnerable to a sufficiently large attack. Also,
let x = inf {x : Pr(f? < 9\x) < 1} and x = sup{x : Pr(# < 9\x) > 0} ; if the noise £ has bounded
support [—1,-1-1], x = 9 — e and x = 9 + e, whereas x = — oo and x = +oo if the noise has
unbounded full support. Next, note that r > represents the efficient, or cost-minimizing, interest
rate. We normalize C(r) = and, without any loss of generality, let the domain of the interest rate
be 11 = [r, r], where r solves C(r) = max# {V(9, 0) — V(9, 1)}; r represents the maximal interest
rate the bank is ever willing to set in order to deter an attack. To make things interesting, we
assume r < 7T, which ensures that it is too costly for the bank to raise the interest rate to totally
offset the devaluation premium. Finally, to simplify the exposition, we let V(9, a) — 9 — a. It
follows that 9 = = C{r) and 9 = 1 = C{f).
J That the bank has no private information about the cost of raising the interest rate is not essential.
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2.2 Equilibrium Definition
In the analysis that follows, we restrict attention to perfect Bayesian equilibria that are not sen-
sitive to whether the idiosyncratic noise in the observation of the fundamentals has bounded or
unbounded (full) support. We refer to equilibria that can be sustained under both specifications of
the information structure as robust equilibria. We will also verify that all robust equilibria satisfy
the intuitive criterion refinement, first introduced in Cho and Kreps (1987). As the global coordi-
nation game described in Section 2.1 is very different from the class of signaling games examined
in the literature, it is useful to formalize the equilibrium concept and the intuitive criterion test for
the strategic context of this paper.
Definition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of functions r : —> 1Z. D : x [0. 1] x
K -> [0, 1], a : R x K -> [0, 1], a : x K -> [0, l] , and (cOxRxR-. [0, 1] , such that:
r{9) G argmaxt/(r,a(6>,r),.D(6*,o(0,r),7-),6l); (1)
+oo
a(x,r) G arg max J u(r, a, D (#, a(9,r),r))du(9\x,r) anda{9,r)— J a(x, r)ip (^r- ) dx; (2)
a€[0,l] e
D(9,a,r) G are max U(r,a,D,9); (3)
£>e[o,i] v '
u (9\x, r) = for all 9 (£ 0(x) and [i [9\x. r) satisfies Bayes' rule for any r G r(0(x)), (4)
where 0(x) = {9 : ip { £=^) > 0} is the set of fundamentals 9 consistent with signal x.
r(9) is the policy of the bank and D(9,a,r) is the probability of devaluation. u(9\x.r) is
a speculator's posterior belief about 9 conditional on private signal x and interest rate r, a(x,r)
is the speculator's position in the foreign-exchange market, and a(9,r) the associated aggregate
demand for foreign currency. 6 Conditions (1) and (3) mean that the interest rate set in stage 1
and the devaluation decision in stage 3 are sequentially optimal for the bank, whereas condition
(2) means that the portfolio choice in stage 2 is sequentially optimal for the speculators, given
beliefs u(9\x,r) about 9. Finally, condition (4) requires that beliefs do not assign positive measure
to fundamentals 9 that are not compatible with the private signals x. and are pinned down by
Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path. To simplify notation, in what follows we will also refer to
D{9) = D(9,r(9),a{9,r(9)) as the equilibrium devaluation probability for type 9.
That a(8, r) = /_ °° a(x, r)ip (-— ) dx represents the fraction of speculators attacking the currency follows directly
from the Law of Large Numbers when there are countable infinitely many agents; with a continuum, see Judd (1985).
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Definition 2 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is robust if and only if the same policy r(9) and
devaluation outcome D(9) can be sustained with both bounded and unbounded idiosyncratic noise
in the speculators' observation of 9.
As it will become clear in Section 4, this refinement simply eliminates strategic effects that
depend critically on whether the speculators' private information has bounded or unbounded full
support over the fundamentals. Note that robustness imposes no restriction on the precision of the
signals.
Definition 3 Let U{9) denote the equilibrium payoff of the central bank when the fundamentals are
9, and define 0(r) as the set of 9 for whom the choicer is dominated in equilibrium by r (9) andM{r)
as the set of posterior beliefs that assign zero measure to any 9 £ 0(r) whenever Q(r) C Q(x). 7 A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion test if and only if, for any # £
and any r e TZ. U (9) > U (r, a(6*,r), D(9,a(9,r),r),9)
,
for a(9,r) satisfying (2) with a <E M{r).
In words, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion test when there is a type
9 that would be better off by choosing an interest rate r ^ r(9) should speculators' reaction not
be sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that assign positive measure to types for whom r is
dominated in equilibrium by r{9). Such beliefs are often highly implausible, although consistent
with the definition of perfect Bayesian equilibria. In our game, all robust equilibria pass the intuitive
criterion test.
2.3 Model Discussion
The particular pay-off structure and many of the institutional details of the specific coordination
environment we consider in this paper are not essential for our results. For example, the cost of
the interest rate can be read as the cost of implementing a particular policy; this may depend also
on the fundamentals of the economy, as well as the aggregate response of the market. Similarly,
the value of maintaining the peg represents the value of coordinating the market on a particular
action; this may depend, not only on the underlying fundamentals and the reaction of the market,
but also on the policy itself.
That stage 3 is strategic is also not essential. Given the payoff function of the central bank, the
devaluation policy is sequentially optimal if and only if D(9, r, a) = 1 whenever V(9, a) < and
7 Formally, 0(r) = {9 such that U (9) > U {r,a(9,r), D(9,a(9,r),r),9) for any a(9,r) satisfying (2) and (4) with
H £ A4(r)}, wherejVI(r) = {fi satisfying (4) and such that fi (9\x,r) = for any 9 € 0(r) if Q(r) C G(i)}.
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D(9, r, a) = whenever V(9, a) > 0, for any r. All our results would hold true if the currency were
exogenously devalued for any 9 and a such that V(9, a) < 0, as in the case the bank has no choice but
to abandon the peg whenever the aggregate demand of foreign currency (a) exceeds the amount
of foreign reserves (6). Indeed, although described as a three-stage game, the model essentially
reduces to a two-stage game, where in the first stage the policy maker signals information about 6
to the market and in the second stage speculators play a global coordination game in response to
the action of the policy maker. Stage 3 serves only to introduce strategic complementarities in the
actions of market participants. 8
In short, we suggest that our model may well fit a broader class of environments in which a
stage of endogenous information transmission (signaling) is followed by a global coordination game,
such as, for example, in the case of a government offering an investment subsidy in an attempt
to stimulate the adoption of a new technology, or a telecommunications company undertaking an
aggressive advertising campaign in attempt to persuade consumers to adopt her service.
3 Policy Traps
3.1 Exogenous versus Endogenous Policy
Suppose for a moment that the interest rate r is exogenously fixed, say r = r. Our model then
reduces to the model of Morris and Shin (1998). The lack of common knowledge over the fun-
damentals eliminates any possibility of coordination and iterated deletion of strongly dominated
strategies selects a unique equilibrium profile and a unique system of equilibrium beliefs.
Proposition 1 (Morris-Shin) In the speculative game with exogenous interest rate policy, there
exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which a speculator attacks if and only if x < xms
and the bank devalues if and only if 6 < 9ms- The thresholds xms and 9ms are defined by
9ms =^ = * (
^/S
;
gMS
)
(5)
and are decreasing in r.
Note that, if the bank could commit never to devalue in stage 3, there would be no speculation in stage 2, and
the market would not play a coordination game. Such lack of commitment is essential for the literature on policy
discretion and expectation traps, but not for our results. What is essential for the kind of policy traps we identify in
this paper is that the game the market plays in response to the action of the policy maker is a global coordination
game; the origin of strategic complementarities is irrelevant.
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Proof. Uniqueness is established in Morris and Shin (1998). Here, we only characterize
xms and 9ms in our setting. Given that D{9) — 1 if 9 < 9ms and D(9) = otherwise, a
speculator with signal x finds it optimal not to attack if and only if -k[x{9 < 9ms\x) < L, where
H(0 < 9MS \x) = fg<eMs dfi(0\x). By Bayes rule, fi{9 < 9Ms\x) = 1 - * (s=tot*>) . Thus, xMS
solves the indifference condition it 1 — \Im XMS ~ MS
J
= r. The fraction of speculators attacking
is then a{9,r) = Pr(x < xMS \9) = * Umjz=1\ it follows that V(9,a(6,r)) < 0, and hence
the bank devalues, if and only if 9 < 9ms, where 9ms solves V(9MS, a{&MSiL)) — 0, that is,
&MS ~ ^ (
XM5 ~ MS
j . Combining the indifference condition for the speculators with that for the
central bank gives (5). It is then immediate that xms and 9ms are both decreasing in r.
The larger the return on the domestic asset, or the higher the cost of short-selling the domestic
currency, the less attractive it is for a speculator to take the risk of attacking the currency It follows
that xms and 9ms are decreasing functions of r, which suggests that the monetary authority should
be able to reduce the likelihood and severity of a currency crisis by simply raising the domestic
interest rate, or more generally reducing the speculators' ability and incentives to attack.
Indeed, that would be the end of the story if the policy did not convey any information to
the market. However, since raising the interest rate is costly, a high interest rate signals that the
bank is willing to defend the currency and hence that the fundamentals are not too weak. On the
other hand, as long as speculators do not attack when their private signal is sufficiently high, the
bank faces only a small attack when the fundamentals are sufficiently strong, in which case there
is no need to raise the interest rate. Therefore, any attempt to defend the peg by increasing the
interest rate is interpreted by the market as a signal of intermediate fundamentals,9 in which case
speculators may coordinate on either an aggressive or a lenient course of action. Different modes of
coordination then create different incentives for the policy maker and result in different equilibria.
At the end, which equilibrium is played, how high is the level of the policy the bank needs to set
in order to be spared from a crisis, and what is the critical value of the fundamentals below which
a devaluation occurs, are all determined by self-fulfilling market expectations.
Theorem 1 (Policy Traps) In the speculative game ivith endogenous policy, there exist multiple
perfect Bayesian equilibria for any e > 0.
' This interpretation of the information conveyed by a high interest rate follows from Bayes' rule if the observed
level of the interest rate is on the equilibrium path, and from forward induction (the intuitive criterion) otherwise.
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(a) There is an inactive-policy equilibrium: The bank sets the cost-minimizing interest rate
r for all 9 and devaluation occurs if and only if 6 < 9ms-
(b) There is a continuum of active-policy equilibria: Let r solve C(r) — ^p; For any
r* 6 {r,r\, there is an equilibrium in which the bank sets either r or r*, raises the interest rate at
r* only for 9 € [9* , 9**], and devalues if and only if 9 < 9* , where
9*=C(r*) and 9** = 9* + e [*
_1
(l - ^0*) - #_1 (0*)] (6)
The threshold 9* is independent of e and can take any value in {9,9ms], whereas the threshold 6**
is increasing in e and converges to 9* as e —> 0.
All the above equilibria are robust, satisfy the intuitive criterion, and can be supported by
strategies for the speculators that are monotonic in x.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Propositions 2 and 3, which we present in the next two
sections. Theorem 1 states that there is a continuum of equilibria, which contrasts with the unique-
ness result and the policy conjecture of Morris and Shin. The policy maker is subject to policy traps:
In her attempt to use the interest rate so as to fashion the size of a currency attack, the monetary
authority reveals information that the fundamentals are neither too weak nor too strong. This in-
formation facilitates coordination in the market, sustains multiple self-fulfilling market responses to
the same policy choice, and leads to a situation where the effectiveness of any particular policy (the
eventual devaluation outcome) and the shape of the optimal policy are dictated by the arbitrary
aggressiveness of market expectations. In the inactive-policy equilibrium, speculators expect the
bank never to raise the interest rate and play the same continuation equilibrium (attacking if and
only if x < xms) f°r anY r - Anticipating this, the bank finds it pointless to raise the interest rate,
which in turn vindicates market expectations. In an active-policy equilibrium instead, speculators
expect the bank to raise the interest rate at r* only for 9 G [9*, 9**], coordinate on an aggressive
response for any r < r* and on a lenient one for any r > r*. Again, the bank can do no better than
simply conforming to the arbitrary self-fulfilling expectations of the market.
All equilibria in Theorem 1 can be supported by simple threshold strategies for the speculators
that are monotonic in x. That is, given any policy choice r, a speculator attacks the currency if
and only his private signal about the fundamentals falls below a threshold which depends on the
particular equilibrium played by the market.
Finally, note that all active-policy equilibria in Theorem 1 share the following properties. First,
the devaluation outcome is monotonic in the fundamentals. Second, the devaluation threshold
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is determined by self-fulfilling market expectations, but never exceeds the devaluation threshold
that would prevail under policy inaction. Third, when the fundamentals are either very weak, or
sufficiently strong, the market can easily recognize this, in which case there is no value for the
policy maker to raise the interest rate; it is then only for a small range of moderate fundamentals
that the market is likely to be "uncertain" or "confused" about eventual devaluation outcomes,
and it is thus only for moderate fundamentals that the policy maker is "anxious to prove herself
by taking a costly policy action. Fourth, the "anxiety region" shrinks as the precision of market
information increases. In Section 4, we further discuss the robustness of these policy predictions.
3.2 Inactive Policy Equilibrium
When the interest rate is endogenous, the Morris-Shin outcome survives as an inactive policy
equilibrium, in which the interest rate remains uninformative about the probability the currency
will be devalued.
Proposition 2 (Perfect Pooling) There is a robust inactive policy equilibrium, in which the
central bank sets r for all 9, speculators attack if and only if x < xms, independently of the interest
rate chosen by the central bank, and devaluation occurs if and only if 9 < 9ms- The thresholds xms
and 9ms are defined as in (5).
Proof. Since in equilibrium all 9 set r = r, the observation of r conveys no information about
the fundamentals 9 and hence the continuation game starting after the bank sets r = r is isomorphic
to the Morris-Shin game: There is a unique continuation equilibrium, in which a speculator attacks
if and only if x < xms and the central bank devalues if and only if 9 < 9ms- Equilibrium beliefs
are then pinned down by Bayes' rule.
Next, consider out-of-equilibrium interest rates. Note that r solves C(r) = V(#mS)0). Any
r > r is dominated in equilibrium by r for all types: For 9 < 9ms, V[6,0) — C(r) < 0; for
> 9ms, C{r) > 9Ms > a(9,r) and thus V(6,Q) - C(r) < V(6,a{9,r)). On the other hand, any
r G (r,r) is dominated in equilibrium by r(9) for any 9 such that 9 < C{r) or a(9,r) < C(r),
where C(r) < C(r) = 9ms- Therefore, for any out-of-equilibrium r ^ r, one can construct out-
of-equilibrium beliefs /i that satisfy (4) and the intuitive criterion, i.e. \± G M{r), and such that
fi(9 < ^A/s|x,r) is non-increasing in x and satisfies irn(9 < 9Ms\x , r ) — r at x — XMS- For such
beliefs, a speculator finds it optimal to attack if and only if x < xms, forcing devaluation to occur
if and only if 9 < 9ms- Finally, for r = r,
10 let h(9ms\x , tO = 1 for all x such that 6ms £ ®{x ), and
Note that r is dominated in equilibrium by r for all 6 7^ 0ms-
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fj,{0\x,r) = n{0\x) otherwise, so that again (4) and the intuitive criterion are satisfied. Then, there
is a mixed-strategy equilibrium for the continuation game following r = r, in which a speculator
attacks if and only if x < xms and type 9ms devalues with probability r/it.
Given that speculators attack if and only if x < xms f°r anY r i it is optimal for the central
bank to set r{9) = r for all 9. Finally, consider robustness in the sense of Definition 2. Given
6ms = ^—^ G (0,1), (5) is satisfied for any e > and any c.d.f. \P, with either bounded or
unbounded support, by simply letting xms = 9ms+^^~ 1 {&ms)- It follows that the policy r{9) = r
for all 9, and the devaluation outcome D(9) — 1 for 9 < 9ms and D(9) = otherwise, can be
sustained as a robust equilibrium.
The inactive policy equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. 9 is on the horizontal axis, a and C
on the vertical one. The devaluation threshold 9ms is the point of intersection between the value of
defending the peg 9 and the size of the attack a(9,r). Figure 1 also illustrates the intuitive criterion.
Note that the equilibrium payoff is U{9) = for all 9 < 9MS and U(9) = 6 - a{6,r) > for all
> 9MS- Consider a deviation to some r' G (r, r) and let 9' and 9" solve 9' = C(r') = a(9",r).
Note that C(r') > 9 if and only 9 < 9' and C(r') > a{9, r) if and only if 6 > 9", which implies that
r' is dominated in equilibrium by r if and only if 9 £ [#',#"]. Hence, if 9 G [9', 6"] and the bank
deviates to 7-', the market "learns" that 6 £ [9',9"}. }l Furthermore, since 9ms 6 \®' -.9"}, one can
construct beliefs that are compatible with the intuitive criterion for which speculators continue to
attack whenever x < xms, in which case it is pointless for the bank to raise the interest rate at r'
.
Insert Figure 1 here
Clearly, any system of beliefs and strategies such that a(9,r) > a(9,r) for all r > r sustains
policy inaction as an equilibrium; the bank has then no choice but to set r(9) — r for all 6, confirm-
ing the expectations of the market. Note that a higher interest rate increases the opportunity cost
of attacking the currency and, other things equal, reduces the speculators' incentives to attack. In
an inactive-policy equilibrium, however, this portfolio effect is offset by the higher probability spec-
ulators attach to a final devaluation. The particular beliefs we consider in the proof of Proposition
2 have the property that these two effects just offset each other, in which case speculators use the
11 Throughout the paper, the expression "the market learns X by observing Y" means that the event X becomes
common p = 1 belief among the speculators given that Y is common knowledge; see Monderer and Samet (1989)
and Kajii and Morris (1995).
Coordination and Policy Traps 15
same strategy on and off the equilibrium path and condition their behavior only on their private
information. It is then as if speculators do not pay attention to the policy of the bank. 12
3.3 Active Policy Equilibria
We now prove the existence of robust active-policy equilibria in which the bank raises the interest
rate at r* for every 9 G [9*, 9**].
Proposition 3 (Two-Threshold Equilibria) For any r*
€
{r,r\, there is a two-threshold equi-
librium in which the central bank sets r* for all 9 G [9* ,9**] and r otherwise; speculators attack if
and only if either r < r* and x < x* , or r > r* and x < x; finally, devaluation occurs if and only if
9 < 9* . x* solves itu(9 < 9*\x*, r) — r, whereas 9* and 9** are given by (6). A two-threshold equilib-
rium exists if and only if r* G {r,r\ or, equivalently, if and only if 9* G {9,9ms\- All two-threshold
equilibria are robust.
Proof. Let 9 G [9* ,9**) solve V{9,a{9,r)) = 0, where a{9,r) = vp (~-) , and note that, for
any r < r* , speculators trigger devaluation if and only if 9 < 9.
Consider first the behavior of the speculators. When r = r, beliefs are pinned down by Bayes'
rule for all z, since (6) ensures 0(x) ^ [9* ,9**] for all x. 13 Therefore,
(jL{D{9) = l\x,r)=n(6<6\x,r) = fj.{0<e*\x,r) = -
which is decreasing in x. We let x* be the unique solution to [i(9 < 9*\x*,r) = r/ir. For any
r E {r,r*), we consider out-of-equilibrium beliefs a such that jj,(9 < 9\x,r) is non-increasing in
x and 7Tfj,(9 < 9\x,r) = r at x = x*. Furthermore, if for some 9 G Q{x), r is not dominated in
equilibrium by r(9), i.e., if C(r) < min {a{9,r),9} , then we further restrict /j, to satisfy /j,(9\x,r) —
for all 9 G Q(x) such that 9 < C(r) or a(9,r) < C(r). When r = r* , Bayes' rule implies
u(9 G [9*,9**]\x,r*) = 1 for all x such that 6(x) n [9*, 9**] £ 0. Finally, for any (x,r) such that
either r = r* and 0(x) n [9* ,9**} — 0, or r > r*, we let u(9 > 9\x,r) = 1 for all x > x and
m(^ > Q\ x , r ) — otherwise. Given these beliefs, (4) is satisfied, /j, G M{r) for any r, and the
strategy of the speculators is sequentially optimal.
'"Moreover, speculators do not need to "learn" how to behave off the equilibrium path; they simply continue to
play the same strategy they "learned" to play in equilibrium.
1 When the noise is unbounded, this is immediate; when it is bounded, it follows from the fact that \6" — 6*\ < 2e
and 0(x) = [x — e, x + e], for any x.
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Consider next the central bank. Given the strategy of the speculators, the bank clearly prefers
r to any r 6 (r, r*) and r* to any r > r*. 9* is indifferent between setting r* (and not being
attacked) and setting r (and being forced to devalue) if and only if V[9*,0) — C(r*) = 0, i.e.
0* = C{r*). Similarly, 9** is indifferent between setting r* (and not being attacked) and setting
r (and being attacked without devaluing) if and only if V(9**,Q) - C{r*) = V(9*\ a{9**
,
r)),
i.e. C(r*) = a(9**,r), where a(9",r) = * i 1^1 )- For any 9 < 9* , r is optimal; for any
9 6 (9*, 9**), a (9,r) > a (9**,r) = C (r*) and thus r* is preferred to r, whereas the reverse is true
for any 9 > 9** . From the indifference conditions for 9*, 9** , and x* , we obtain x* = 9** + e^~ l {9*)
and
+ £ V 1 ^-^**)-*- 1 (**)] (7)
It follows that 9* < 9** if and only if 9* < [ix - r)/ir = 9MS - Using 9* = C{r*) and 9MS = C{r), we
infer that a two threshold equilibrium exists if and only if 9* 6 (9, 9ms], or equivalently r* £ {r,r\.
Finally, consider robustness in the sense of Definition 2. For any r* £ {r,r), let 9* — C(r*) and take
any arbitrary 9** > 9*. For any c.d.f. ^ with either bounded support [— l.+l] or unbounded full
support R, we have that k = V 1 (l -
^Tr *) ~^ ( e*)} e (0, oo) since (1 - ^9*) e (fi*, 1).
Hence, for any 9** > 9* and for any k. condition (7) can always be satisfied by letting e = —^— €
(0, oo). For r* — r, 9* — 9** = 9ms and (7) holds for every e and every ^. The indifference
condition for the speculators is then clearly satisfied at x* = 9** + e^>~ i (9*). It follows that the
policy r{9) = r* if 9 £ [6>*,#**] and r(#) = r otherwise, and the devaluation outcome D{9) = 1 if
6 < 9* and D(9) = otherwise, can be sustained as a robust equilibrium.
A two-threshold equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. Like in the inactive policy equilibrium,
the observation of any interest rate r > r is interpreted by market participants as a signal of
intermediate fundamentals. However, contrary to the inactive policy equilibrium, speculators switch
from playing aggressively (attacking if and only if x < x*) to playing leniently (attacking if and
only if x < x) whenever the policy meets market expectations (r > r*). Anticipating this reaction
by market participants, the bank finds it optimal to raise the interest rate to defend the currency
whenever the fundamentals are strong enough that the net value of defending the currency offsets
the cost of raising the interest rate (9 > 9*), but not so strong that the cost of facing a small and
unsuccessful attack is lower than the cost of raising the interest rate (9 < 9**). The thresholds 9* and
9** are determined by the indifference conditions 9* = C{r*) and a(9**,r) — C(r*), as illustrated
in Figure 2. Finally, note that, in any two-threshold equilibrium, the exact fundamentals 9 never
become common knowledge among speculators. What the market "learns" from equilibrium policy
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observations is only whether 6 [6*, 9**] or £ [6*, 9**}, but this is enough to facilitate coordination.
Insert Figure 2 here
There are other out-of-equilibrium beliefs and strategies for the speculators that also sustain
the same two-threshold equilibria. For example, we could have assumed speculators coordinate on
the most aggressive continuation equilibrium (attack if and only if x < x) whenever the policy falls
short of market expectations (r < r < r*). Nonetheless, the beliefs and strategies we consider in
the proof of Proposition 3 have the appealing property that the speculators' strategy is the same
for all r < r* . It is then as if speculators simply "ignore" any attempt of the policy maker that falls
short of market expectations and continue to play exactly as if there had been no intervention.
For any r*, the devaluation threshold 9* is independent of e, whereas 9** is increasing in e and
9**
—> 9* as e —> 0. As private information becomes more precise, the bank needs to raise the interest
rate only for a smaller measure of fundamentals. At the limit, the interest rate policy has a spike
at an arbitrary devaluation threshold 9* 6 (9, 9ms] dictated by market expectations. Note also
that a two-threshold equilibrium exists if and only if 9* < 9ms- The intuition behind this result is
as follows. From the bank's indifference conditions, 9* — C (r*) = a (9** ,r) , we infer that a higher
r* raises both the devaluation threshold 9* and the size of the attack at 9** . The latter is given
by Pr(x < x*|0**), which is also equal to Pr(0 > 9**\x*). Therefore, Pr(0 > 9**\x*) increases with
r*
.
For a marginal speculator to be indifferent between attacking and non attacking conditional
on r = r, it must be that Pr(6> < 0*|x*) also increases with r* . It follows that A0(r*) = 9** - 9*
is decreasing in r*. Obviously, A0(r*) is also continuous in r*. A two-threshold equilibrium exists
if and only if A9(r*) > 0. By the monotonicity of A9(r*), there exists at most one r such that
A0(r) = 0, and A0(r*) > if and only if r* < r. But A0(r) = if and only if 0* = 0**, in
which case the continuation game following r is (essentially) the Morris-Shin game and therefore
0* = 0** = 9ms- It follows that, r solves C(r) = V(0ms, 0) = -^= and a two-threshold equilibrium
exists if and only if r* £ {r 7 r\, or equivalently, if and only if 9* 6 (0, 9ms]- In Section 4, we will
establish that these properties extends to all robust equilibria of the game.
3.4 Discussion
We conclude this section with a few remarks about the role of coordination, signaling, and com-
mitment in our environment.
First, consider environments where the market does not play a coordination game in response
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to the policy maker, such as when the bank (sender) interacts with a single speculator (receiver). 14
In such environments, the policy can be non-monotonic if the receivers have access to exogenous
information that allows to separate very high from very low types of the sender (Feltovich, Harbaugh
and To, 2002). Moreover, multiple equilibria could possibly be supported by different out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. However, a unique equilibrium would typically survive the intuitive criterion
or other proper refinements. To the contrary, the multiplicity we have identified in this paper
does not depend in any critical way on the specification of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, originates
merely in endogenous coordination, and would not arise in environments with a single receiver.
The comparison is sharp if we consider e —> 0. The limit of all equilibria of the game with a single
speculator would have the latter attacking the currency if and only if x < 6, and the bank devaluing
if and only if 6 < 0. Contrast this with our findings in Theorem 1, where the devaluation threshold
0* can take any value in (0,6ms]-
Second, consider environments where there is no signaling, such as standard global coordination
games. As shown in Morris and Shin (2001) and Hellwig (2002), these games may exhibit multiple
equilibria if market participants observe sufficiently informative public signals about the underlying
fundamentals. The multiplicity of equilibria documented in Theorem 1, however, is substantially
different from the kind of multiplicity in that literature. The policy in our model does generate a
public signal about the fundamentals. Yet, the informational content of this signal is endogenous,
as it depends on the particular equilibrium played in the market. Moreover, Theorem 1 is not
about the possibility of multiple continuation equilibria in the coordination game that follows a
given realization of the public signal; it is rather about how endogenous coordination in the market
makes the effectiveness of the policy depend on arbitrary market sentiments and leads to multiple
equilibria in the signaling game.
Third, note that policy introduces a very specific kind of signal. The observation of active policy
reveals that the fundamentals are neither too weak nor too strong, and it is this particular kind
of information that restores the ability of the market to coordinate on different courses of action.
In this respect, an interesting extension is to consider the possibility the policy itself is observed
with noise. It can be shown that all equilibria of Theorem 1 are robust to the introduction of
small bounded noise in the speculators' observation of the policy, whether the noise is aggregate or
idiosyncratic. 15
Lastly, consider the role of commitment. Note that policy traps arise in our environment because
'See, for example, Drazen (2001).
'The proof of this claim is available upon request.
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the policy maker moves first, thus revealing valuable information about the fundamentals, which
market participants use to coordinate their response to the policy choice. This raises the question
of whether the policy maker would be better off committing to a certain level of the policy before
observing 6, thus inducing a unique continuation equilibrium in the coordination game. To see that
commitment is not necessarily optimal, suppose the noise £ has full support and consider e —> 0.
If the policy maker commits ex ante to some interest rate r, she incurs a cost C(r) and ensures
that devaluation will occur if and only if 8 < 8{r) = ^^^j moreover, for all 8 > 6(r), a(8,r) —> as
e -» 0.
16 Hence, the ex ante payoff from committing to r is U{r) = Pr(0 > 8{r))E[8\8 > ?(/)] -C(r).
Let Uc — maxr U(r) and 8C — min{8(rc )\rc G argmaxr U(r)}. If instead the policy maker retains the
option to fashion the policy contingent on 8, the ex ante payoff depends on the particular equilibrium
(r*, #*,#**) the policy maker expects to be played. 17 As e —> 0, 8** —> 8* and a(8,r) —> for all
8 > 8**, meaning the bank pays C(r*) only for a negligible measure of 8. It follows that the ex
ante value of discretion is Ud — Pr(# > #*)E [8\8 > 8*} . But note that 9C > 8, and therefore any
8* G (9, 8C ) necessarily leads to Ud > Uc . A similar argument holds for arbitrary e. We conclude
that, even when perfect commitment is possible, the government will prefer discretion ex ante as
long as she is not too pessimistic about future market sentiments.
4 Robust Policy Predictions
Propositions 2 and 3 left open the possibility that there also exist other equilibria outside the two
classes of Theorem 1 , which would only strengthen our argument that policy endogeneity facilitates
coordination and leads to policy traps. Nonetheless, we are also interested in identifying equilibria
that are not sensitive to the particular assumptions about the underlying information structure of
the game, in which case "robust" policy predictions can be made.
We first note that, when the noise has unbounded full support, for any r* G (r,r\ one can con-
struct a one-threshold equilibrium, in which speculators threaten to attack the currency whenever
they observe any r < r*
:
no matter how high their private signal x, thus forcing the bank to raise
the interest rate at r* for all 8 above the devaluation threshold 9*
,
where 8* solves V(6*, 0) = C(r*).
This threat is sustained by beliefs such that speculators interpret any failure of the bank to raise
the interest rate as a signal of devaluation independently of their private information about the
I6 These results follow from Proposition 1, replacing r with an arbitrary r,
1
' Note that the payoff for the policy maker associated with the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 2 equals the
payoff associated with the two-threshold equilibrium in which 8* = 0ms-
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fundamentals. It seems more plausible, however, that speculators remain confident that the peg
will be maintained when they observe sufficiently high x even if the bank fails to raise the interest
rate, in which case all one-threshold equilibria disappear. This is necessarily true when the noise is
bounded: For x > x = 9 + e speculators find it dominant not to attack, which implies that for all
> x + £ the bank faces no attack and hence sets r..
On the other hand, when the noise has a bounded support, it is possible for the market to
separate types that set the same interest rate. For example, suppose that for some 01,62,03,84
with 6>! < 2 < 2 + 2e < 3 < 4 , the bank sets r(0) = r' for any G [0i, 2 ] U [03 , 4 ] and r(0) ^ r'
otherwise. Since [0i,02] and [03,04] are sufficiently apart and the noise is bounded, whenever r' is
observed in equilibrium, it is common p = 1 belief among the speculators whether G [0i,02] or
€ [03,04]- In principle, the possibility for the market to separate different subsets of types who
set the same interest rate may lead to equilibria different from the ones in Theorem 1. However,
this possibility critically depends on small bounded noise and disappears with large bounded or
unbounded supports, whatever the precision of the noise.
We conclude that unbounded noise introduces strategic effects that are not robust to bounded
noise, and vice versa. It is these considerations that motivated the refinement in Definition 2.
We seek to identify equilibrium predictions that are robust to whether the noise is bounded or
unbounded. The following then provides the converse to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Robust Equilibria) Every robust perfect Bayesian equilibrium belongs to one of
the two classes of Theorem. 1. If the distribution of the noise satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio
property, any robust active-policy equilibrium is a two-threshold equilibrium as in Proposition 3.
We sketch the intuition for Theorem 2 here and present the formal proof in the Appendix.
Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. If all set r, we have perfect pooling.
Otherwise, let
0' = inf{0 : r(0) > r} and 0" = sup{0 : r(0) > r)
be, respectively, the lowest and highest type who raise the interest rate. Since there is no aggregate
uncertainty, the central bank can perfectly anticipate whether she will devalue and hence is willing
to pay the cost of an interest rate r > r only if this leads to no devaluation. It follows that
any equilibrium observation of r > r necessarily signals that there will be no devaluation and
induces any speculator not to attack. If there were more than one interest rates above r played
in equilibrium, and the noise were unbounded, the bank could always ensure no devaluation by
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setting the lowest equilibrium interest rate above r. Since C(r) is strictly increasing, it follows
that at most one interest rate above r is played in any robust equilibrium. Let r* denote this
interest rate and define 9* and 9** as in Theorem 1. Obviously, it never pays to raise the interest
rate for any 9 < 9* . Hence, in any robust equilibrium, 9' > 9*. If the noise were bounded, all
9>x + e = 9 + 2e would necessarily set r. Hence, in any robust equilibrium, 9" < oo. Compare
now the strategy of the speculators in any such equilibrium with the strategy in the corresponding
two-threshold equilibrium. Any 9 > 9* necessarily does not devalue as it can guarantee herself a
positive payoff by setting r = r* . If there also exist types 9 < 9* who do not devalue, then the
incentives to attack when observing r are lower than when all 9 < 6* devalue. Similarly, if there
exist types 9 G [#*,#"] who do not raise the interest rate at r*, then the observation of r = r is
less informative of devaluation than in the case where all 9 G [#*,#"] set r* . Hence, speculators
are most aggressive at r when D(9) = 1 for all 9 < 9* and r(9) — r* for all [#*,#"], which, by
definition of 9**
,
is possible if and only if 9" — 9** . Equivalently, the size of the attack in the
two-threshold equilibrium corresponding to r* represents an upper bound on the size of the attack
in any active-policy equilibrium in which r* is played. It follows that, in any robust equilibrium,
9" < 9**
. Since 9** < 9* whenever r* > r, this immediately rules out the possibility of equilibria in
which r* > r. On the other hand, for any r* < r, we have
9* <9' < 9" <9**.
It follows that the anxiety region of any robust equilibrium is bounded by the anxiety region of the
corresponding two-threshold equilibrium. By iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, one
can also show that all 9 < 9* necessarily devalue and that 9' — 9*
,
which proves the first part of
Theorem 2.
Observe next that the monotonicity of the devaluation policy implies monotonicity of the spec-
ulators' strategy as long as the posterior probability of devaluation is monotonic in the speculators'
private signals. The latter is necessarily true when the noise distribution satisfies the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP), that is, when ip'(z)/ip(z) is decreasing in z. In this case, the
size of the attack a(9,r) is decreasing in 9, and therefore all 9 G [9*, 9"\ raise the interest rate
at r*. But then 9" = 9** and r{9) = r* if and only if 9 G [9*, 9**], which completes the second
part of the theorem. When instead the speculators' posteriors fail to be monotonic in x, we can
not exclude the possibility there also exist active-policy equilibria different from the two-threshold
equilibria, namely equilibria in which the policy maker raises the interest rate at r* only for a
subset of [9*, 9**}. Nevertheless, in any such equilibrium, it remains true that devaluation occurs if
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and only if 9 < 9* and the policy is active only for 9 £ [9*, 9**}. Finally, we earlier noted that the
perfect-pooling and two-threshold equilibria can be supported by strategies for the speculators that
are monotonic in the private information x. If one restricts attention to such simple x—monotonic
strategies, the MLRP condition in the second part of Theorem 2 can be dispensed.
Recall that in an inactive-policy equilibrium r is dominated by r for every 9 if and only if r. > r.
In other words, r represents the maximal interest rate that the bank would ever be tempted to
deviate to in the inactive-policy equilibrium. Following Theorems 1 and 2, the policy in any robust
equilibrium is bounded above by r. Equivalently, the devaluation threshold with active policy is
always lower than the one with inactive policy.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is that as private information becomes more precise, the
anxiety region in any robust active-policy equilibrium shrinks. In the limit, the policy converges to
a spike around the devaluation threshold dictated by market sentiments.
Corollary 1 (Limit) The limit of any robust equilibrium as £ —> is such that the policy is
r{9) = r for all 9^9*, for any arbitrary 9* £ {9, #a/s]> and devaluation occurs if and only if
e<e*.
At this point, it is interesting to compare the above results with the set of equilibrium policies
that would arise if fundamentals were common knowledge.
Proposition 4 (Common Knowledge) Suppose e = 0. An interest rate policy r : Q —> 7Z can
be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if C {r(9)) < V(9, 0) for 9 € [9, 9] and r{9) = r
for 9 $ [9,9]. Similarly, a devaluation outcome D : G —> [0,1] can be part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium if and only if D{9) € [0, 1] for 9 G [9.9], D{9) = 1 for 9 < 9. and D{9) = for 9 > 9.
Proof. The second part is obvious, so consider the interest rate policy. For 9 < 9, it is dominant
for the bank to set r and devalue and for speculators to attack. Similarly, for 9 > 9, the bank never
devalues, speculators do not attack, and there is no need to raise the interest rate. Finally, take
any 9
€ [9, 9]. The continuation game following any interest rate r is a coordination game with two
(extreme) continuation equilibria, no attack and full attack. Let r{9) be the minimal r for which
speculators coordinate on the no-attack continuation equilibrium, i.e. they attack if and only if
r < r{9). Clearly, it is optimal for the bank to set r{9) > r if and only if V(9,0) - C(r(9)) > 0, or
equivalently C {r{9)) < 9. u
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That is, if the fundamentals were common knowledge, the equilibrium policy r(6) could take
essentially any shape in the critical range [6, 9]. For example, it could have multiple discontinuities
and multiple non-monotonicities. Similarly, the devaluation outcome D(8) could also take any
shape in [9, 6] and need not be monotonic. These results contrast sharply with our results in
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1. When the information about fundamentals is very precise (i.e. e
is small but positive), the policy is active only for a small range of intermediate fundamentals
[6*, 6**], this range vanishes as e —> 0, and the devaluation outcome is necessarily monotonic in
8. We conclude that introducing small idiosyncratic noise in the observation of the fundamentals
does reduce significantly the equilibrium set, as compared to the common knowledge case. The
global-game methodology thus maintains a strong selection power even in our multiple-equilibria
environment.
Another interesting implication of Corollary 1 is that, in the limit, all active-policy equilibria
are observationally equivalent to the inactive-policy equilibrium in terms of the interest rate policy,
although they are very different in terms of the devaluation outcome. An econometrician may
then fail to predict the probability of devaluation on the basis of information on the fundamentals
and the policy of the monetary authority. An even sharper dependence of observable outcomes on
unobservable market sentiments arises if one introduces sunspots, as we discuss next.
5 Uncertainty over the Aggressiveness of Market Expectations
The analysis so far assumed the policy maker was able to anticipate perfectly the aggressiveness
of market expectations, which we identify with the threshold r* at which speculators switch from
an aggressive to a lenient response to the policy. In reality, however, market expectations are hard
to predict, even when the underlying economic fundamentals are perfectly known to the policy
maker. To capture this possibility, we introduce payoff-irrelevant sunspots, on which speculators
may condition their responses to the actions of the policy maker. Instead of modelling explicitly
the sunspots, we assume directly that r* is a random variable with c.d.f. 5> over a compact support
TV C 1Z. The realization of the random variable r* is common knowledge among the speculators,
but is unknown to the bank when it sets the policy. Uncertainty over the aggressiveness of market
expectations then generates random variation in the effectiveness of any given policy choice and
leads to random variation in the devaluation outcome. Different sunspot equilibria are associated
with different distributions ($,Tl*) and result in different equilibrium policies r(9).
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Proposition 5 Take any random variable r* with compact support TV C (r,r) and distribution
<f>. For e > sufficiently small, 16 there exist thresholds 9* e {9,9ms) and #** £ (#*>#) and a
robust equilibrium such that: The central bank follows a non-monotonic policy with r{9) = r for
9 <£ [9* ,9**\, and r(9) G TV with r(9) non- decreasing in 9 for 9 G [#*,#**]; devaluation occurs with
certainty for 9 < 9*, with probability less than one and non-increasing in 9 for 9 e [#*,#**], and
never occurs for 9 > 9** . Finally, 9* is independent of e, ivhereas 9** —> 9* as e — 0.
The sunspot equilibria of Proposition 5 are qualitatively similar to the two-threshold equilibria
of Proposition 3. The policy maker is anxious to prove herself only for a small range of moderate
fundamentals, and this range vanishes as e —> 0. The interval TV represents the set of random
thresholds r* such that speculators coordinate on an aggressive response whenever r < r* and on
a lenient one whenever r > r* . When 9 < 9*
,
raising the policy to any level in TV is too costly
compared to the expected value of defending the peg, in which case the bank finds it optimal to set
r and devalue with certainty. When instead 9 6 [9*, 9**}, it pays to raise the interest rate at some
level in TV so as to lower the probability of a speculative attack. Since the value from defending
the currency is increasing in 9, so is the optimal policy in the range [9*, 9**]. Finally, for 9 > 9**,
the size of the attack at r is so small that the bank prefers the cost of such an attack to the cost of a
high interest rate. The thresholds 9* and 9** axe again given by the relevant indifference conditions
for the bank, but differ from the ones we derived in the absence of sunspots. The definition of the
thresholds and the complete proof of the above proposition are provided in the Appendix. 19
With random variation in the aggressiveness of market expectations, policy traps take an even
stronger form. Not only the policy maker has to adopt a policy that simply confirms market ex-
pectations, but also the equilibrium outcome of any given policy action is determined by animal
spirits and market sentiments. Empirical evidence suggests that raising interest rates does not
systematically prevent an exchange-rate collapse. Kraay (1993), for example, studies the behavior
of interest rates and other measures of monetary policy during 192 episodes of successful and un-
successful speculative attacks and finds a "striking lack of any systematic association whatsoever
between interest rates and the outcome of speculative attacks," even after controlling for various
observable fundamentals. This evidence is hard to reconcile with Morris and Shin's (1998) predic-
The assumption that e is sufficiently small is not essential; it ensures 8" < 8, which we use only to simplify the
construction of these equilibria (see the Appendix).
If one takes a sequence of sunspot equilibria such that TV converges to a single point r°, the thresholds 9" and
8" in Proposition 5 converge to the ones given in (6). That is, the two-threshold equilibria of Proposition 3 can be
read as the limit of sunspot equilibria.
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tion that defense policies decrease the probability of devaluation, but is consistent with the sunspot
equilibria of Proposition 5, where the same combination of interest rates and fundamentals may
lead in equilibrium to either no devaluation or a collapse of the currency.
Finally, the results of this section help understand and formalize the kind of arguments that
commonly appear in the popular press, like the one we quoted from Financial Times in the beginning
of the paper. Once the policy maker has taken a costly policy action in an attempt to achieve a
favorable outcome, the market may be equally likely to "interpret" this action either as a signal of
strength, in which case market participants coordinate on the desirable course of action, or as a
signal of panic, in which case the policy maker's attempt proves in vain.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated the ability of a policy maker to influence market expectations and
control equilibrium outcomes in economies where agents play a global coordination game. We found
that policy endogeneity leads to multiple self-fulfilling equilibria, even when the fundamentals are
observed with idiosyncratic noise. The multiple equilibria take the form of policy traps, where
the policy maker is forced to conform to the arbitrary expectations of the market instead of being
able to fashion the equilibrium outcome. There is an inactive-policy equilibrium in which market
participants coordinate on "ignoring" any attempt of the policy maker to affect market behavior, as
well as a continuum of active-policy equilibria in which market participants coordinate on the level
of the policy beyond which they "reward" the policy maker by playing a favorable continuation
equilibrium. Despite equilibrium multiplicity, information heterogeneity significantly reduces the
equilibrium set as compared to the case of common knowledge and enables robust policy predictions.
Although this paper focused on the particular example of self-fulfilling currency attacks, our
approach may extend to other environments where policy can serve as a coordination device among
market participants. Monetary policy in economies with staggered pricing, fiscal and growth policies
in economies with investment complementarities, and stabilization policies or regulatory interven-
tion during financial or debt crises, are only a few examples where our results might be relevant.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. When no interest rate other than r is played in equilibrium, we have the
pooling equilibrium in (a) of Theorem 1. Hence, in what follows, we consider equilibria in which
r(9) > r for some 9 and we let
9' = inf{9 : r{9) > r} and 9" = sup{6> : r{9) > r}.
We prove the result in a sequence of five lemmas.
Lemma 1. In any robust equilibrium, there is at most one interest rate r* > r played in
equilibrium and 9" < oo.
Proof. Any interest rate r > r is played in equilibrium only if it leads to no devaluation, i.e.
only if D(9) — 0; all types who devalue set r = r. Speculators attack if and only if the expected
devaluation premium is higher than the interest rate differential, i.e. tt j& D (9) d/j, {9\x, t) > r. If
the noise is unbounded, any equilibrium interest rate r > r results in a posterior /x(0o|x, r) — 1 for
all x, where Oo = {9 : D (9) = 0} is the set of fundamentals for which devaluation does not occur.
Hence, no speculator ever attacks when he observes an equilibrium r > r, and thus a(9, r) = for
any equilibrium r > r. Since C(r) is strictly increasing in r, this also implies that, in any robust
equilibrium, at most one interest rate r* ^ r will be chosen by the central bank, which proves the
first part of the lemma. Next, if the noise were bounded, it would be dominant for a speculator
not to attack whenever x > x = 9 + e, in which a(9,r) = for all r whenever 9 > x + e and thus
r(9) = r for all 9 > x + e. Therefore, an equilibrium with 9" = oo could never be sustained with
bounded noise, which proves the second part of the lemma.
Given any r* £ (r,f], define the thresholds
9* = C{r*) and 9** = 9* + e U>~ 1 (l - ^9*) - *- : (9*) .
and note that 9** > 9* when r* < r, 9** = 9" when r* = r. and 9** < 9* when r* > r. For the rest
of the proof, it suffices to consider unbounded noise.
Lemma 2. For any r*
€
(r,r], 9* < 9' and 9" < 9**.
Proof. Since for any 9 < 9*, r* is strictly dominated by r, it immediately follows that 9' > 9* . On
the other hand, any 9 > 9* can always set r* , face no attack, and ensure a payoff V(9. 0) — C(r*) > 0.
Therefore, necessarily D(9) = for all 9 > 9*. However, there may exist types 9 < 9* that also
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do not devalue in equilibrium. Define S(x) as the probability, conditional on x, that 9 < 9* and
D — 0. Further, define p(x) as the probability, conditional on x, that 9 G [9* , #"] and r (9) = r.
Then, the probability of devaluation conditional on x and r is given by
(J.(D = l|x,r)
l-*(z=f)-6{x)
I -V (*=£} +p{x) + ^(^
Clearly, a speculator never attacks at r whenever jjl(D — l|x,r) < r/ir. Define
F(x;9*,9") =
* tf
1 +
x-e"
1-*1 _ $ (*=£. ) + * (*^
Note that F(x;9*,9") is strictly decreasing in x, and let x [9*, 9") solve
F(£;0*,0") =r/w. (8)
Since <5 (x) > and p(x) > 0, we have (J,{D = l|x,r) < F(x;6»*,6l") for all x. It follows that,
whenever x > x(0*,d")
,
fi{D= l|x,r) < F(x;6*,e") < F(x;9*,9") = r/w, and therefore any
speculator with x > x(O*,0"} does not attack in equilibrium. That is, in any equilibrium in
which r* is played, speculators are necessarily at most as aggressive as they would be if it were
the case that D(9) = 1 for all 9 < 9* and r{9) = r* for all 9 G [9*, 9"]. This is intuitive for (i)
a positive probability that D{9) =0 for some 9 < 9* reduces the incentives to attack for every x,
and (ii) a positive probability that r(9) = r for some 9 G [#*,#"] reduces the probability that the
observation of r signals devaluation and therefore also reduces the incentives to attack conditional
on r and x. It follows that for any 9, a (9, r)<^ x(9*,9")-9 From the indifference condition
for 9", we have that a (9",r) = C (r*) . Since C (r*) = 0*, it follows that 9* < *
(
£(g*'e
£
"H
From the indifference conditions of Proposition (3), and using x(9*,9**) = x*, we also have that
9* = * ( —
—
'
e
' —
) . Hence, in any equilibrium in which r* is played, 9" must satisfy
x(9*,9**)-9**<x(9*,9")-9".
From (8), x (#*, 9") — 9" is decreasing in 9"', and hence we conclude that 9" < 9** .
Recall that 9* < 9** if and only if r* < r = C_1 (9ms) For any r* > r, Lemma 2 implies
9" < 9** < 6* < 9', which is a contradiction, since by definition 9' < 9" . Therefore, there exists no
robust equilibrium with r* G (r, r]. On the other hand, in any robust equilibrium where r* G (r,r]
is played, necessarily 9* < 9' < 9" < 9**.
28 G.M. Angeletos, C. Hellwig and A. Pavan
Next, we show, by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, that in any robust equi-
librium in which r* is played, devaluation occurs if and only if 9 < 9* , which in turn implies that
6' = 6*.
Lemma 3. D{9) = 1 for all 9 < 9*, D{9) = for all 9 > 9*, and 9' = 9*.
Proof. Given an arbitrary equilibrium policy r(9), we consider the continuation game that follows
r = r and construct the iterated deletion mapping T : [9, 9'] —> [9, 9'} as follows. Take any
9 <E [0, 9'} and let
1- *(==*)
G{x;9)
1-* (^f-) + p(z) + *
G(x;9) thus represents the probability of 9 < 9, conditional on x and r. Note that limx__ 00 p(x) =
\\mx^ +00 p(x) = and therefore limI__ 0O G(x; 9) — 1 and limz^+00 G(x; 9) = 0. It follows that,
for every 9, there is at least one solution to the equation G(x; 9) = r/n. Then let x = x(9) be the
lowest solution to this equation, i.e. x(9) = min{x | G(x;9) = z/ 7^}, and define 9 = 9(9) as the
unique solution to 8 = * I ^ ) . Note that G(x;9) > r/n for every x < x and * (^J > 9 for
every 9 < 9. That is, if all 9 < 9 are expected to devalue, all x < x necessarily find it optimal to
attack, which in turn implies that any 9 < 9 necessarily devalues, unless 9 is playing r* rather than
r, which happens in equilibrium only if 9 > 9' . The iterated deletion operator T is thus defined by
T (V) = nun [<?', 0f •
Observe that G is strictly increasing in 9, implying that x and therefore 9 are also strictly increasing
in 9. We conclude that the mapping T is weakly increasing for all 9 G [9, 0'] . Obviously, T is
also bounded above by 9'. Finally, note that 9* < 9' < 9** < 00 and 9* < 9ms, but so far we have
ruled out neither 9' < 9ms, nor $ > ^MS-
Next, we compare T with the iterated deletion operator of the Morris-Shin game without
signaling (or, equivalently, of the continuation game at r when the pooling equilibrium is played).
This operator, T : [9,9] -» [9,9], is defined by F{0) = ?, where x - x{9) and 9 = 9{9) are
the unique solutions to 1 - $
(
^~
J
= t/tt and 9 = $ I ^^ j . T has a unique fixed point at
In general, x and therefore 6 need not be continuous in 6. Continuity is ensured when <I< satisfies the MLRP,
in which case G is strictly decreasing in x, implying that G{x,8) — t/tt has a unique solution and this solution is
continuously increasing in 0. All we need, however, is monotonicity of the lowest solution, which is true for any ty.
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9 = 9 = MSi and satisfies 9 < T(9) < 9Ms whenever 9 £ [9,9Ms) and 9 > JF(?) > 9Ms
whenever 9 £ {9Ms,6}- Moreover, since G(x; 9) > 1 - ^ (^f^) for all x and 9, we have x(0) > x(9)
and therefore 0(6*) > 9(9). We conclude that, for any 9 £ [9,9'}, either 0(0) > 0', in which case
T(0) = 9', or 9(9) < 9', in which case T(9) > T(9).
Finally, we consider the sequence {0
fc }£l
x
,
where 9 1 = 9 and 9k+1 = T(9k ) for all fe > 1. This
sequence represents iterated deletion of dominated strategies starting from 0. Since this sequence
is monotone and bounded above by 0' , it necessarily converges to some limit 9°° < 9' . This limit
must be a fixed point of T, that is, 6>°° = T{9°°). We first prove that either 9°° = 9', or 6>°° > 9MS -
Suppose 9°° < 9'. This can be true only if 9(9°°) < 9'. If it were the case that 9°° < 9MS , we
would then have T(9°°) > ^(9°°) > 9°°, which contradicts the assumption that 9°° is a fixed point
for T(-). Therefore, 6>°° = 9' whenever 9' < 9MS , whereas 6>°° > 9MS whenever 9' > 9MS - We
next prove that 9°° = 9' = 9". Suppose that 9' > 9*. If & < 9MS , then 9°° = 9' > 9* and all
9 £ (9* ,9') would devalue in equilibrium. If instead 9' > 9ms, then 9°° > 0ms > 9* and again all
9 £ (9*,9°°) would devalue in equilibrium. But either case is impossible as any 9 > 9* can ensure
no devaluation and a positive payoff by setting r*. Therefore, it is necessarily the case that 9' = 0*
.
This also implies that 9' < 9ms and therefore 9°° = 9' = 9* , which completes the proof of this
lemma.
We next show that, if the posterior beliefs given r are monotonic in x, then speculators follow
a threshold strategy and therefore the size of an attack is decreasing in the fundamentals 9. This
in turns implies that the bank sets r* for all £ [0*. 0**].
Lemma 4. If in equilibrium [i(0 < 0*\x,r) is monotonic in x, then necessarily a(9,r) is strictly
decreasing in 9, in which case 9" = 9**, and r(9) = r* for all 9 £ [9* ,9**).
Proof. Following Lemma 3, the probability of devaluation conditional on x and r is given by
i _ vj, i' x-e'
fj,(D = l\x,r) =ii(9<9*\x,r) = G(x;9*
with lmxr^-oo G(x\9*) = 1 and lim.T^+00 G(x;9*) = 0. When G(x,9*) is monotonic in x. there
is a unique x' such that G(x';9*) = r/n and thus speculators follow a threshold strategy with
a(x,r) — 1 if x < x' and a(x,r) — if x > x' . It follows that a(9,r) is strictly decreasing in 9 and,
since 0" solves a(9" ,r) = C(r*), all 9 £ [9* , 9") necessarily set r*. But then, p (x) = for any x, and
x
1
= x(9*,9"), implying that a(9.r) = *
(
£(e
*'f>~
g
) . Thus, 9" solves *
fiiil£pzil\ = C(r*),
:iO G.M. Angeletos, C. Hellwig and A. Pavan
and from Proposition (3), x {9*, 9**) - 6** = x (6* ,9") - 9". From the monotonicity of £ (0*, 9) - 9
established in Lemma 2, it follows that 9" — 9** .
The above result presumed monotonicity of the posterior f.i(9 < 9*\x,r) in x. Since all 9 < 9*
set r, this is likely to be the case for a wide range of noise structures. In the next lemma, we prove
this is necessarily the case at least when the noise £ follows a distribution which satisfies the MLRP.
Lemma 5. If ^ satisfies the MLRP, then fi(9 < 9*\x,r) is monotonic in x.
Proof. Let 1(9) be the probability that 9 sets r. Using p (x) + # (~-) = fjj? jip (s=s-) I {9) dO,
we have that
c(x-n X
-*H
l-G(x;P)- fifty (£=*) 1(9)
M'
and therefore
d( G ( i;fl ')
"
I l-G(x;9') ^o 1 - *
x-e~ ±{&^{^)no)de)
Ue~^(^L)ne)d9Y
It follows that dG(x;6*)/dx < if and only if
& &(*?)*> Khl>{*T)nO)d9
Using the fact that I (9) = \ for all 9 < 9* , the above is equivalent to
<0.
E ¥ (*?) 9<9\ x, r En *(*?)
which holds true if ip' /ip is monotone decreasing. D
*(H*)
,
x
, L <0,
Combining Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we conclude that any robust equilibrium belongs necessarily
to either (a) or (b) in Theorem 1. If, in addition, ^ satisfies the MLRP, Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that
any equilibrium in (b) is a two-threshold equilibrium, which completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take any random variable r* with compact support TV C (r, r) and
distribution <J>. We want to show that for e sufficiently small, there exist thresholds x* , 9* £ (9, 9ms),
and 9** £ (9* .9), a system of beliefs fi, and a robust equilibrium such that: (i) The bank follows
a non-monotonic policy with r(9) = r for 9 £ [9*. 9**], and r(9) £ TV with r(9) non-decreasing
in 6 for 9 £ \9*,9**\. (ii) Whenever r < r*, speculators attack if and only if x < x*; whenever
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r
€ [r* >?"*), they attack if and only if x < x; and whenever r > r* , they attack if and only if
x < x. (in) Devaluation occurs with probability D(9) — 1 for 9 < 9*, with probability D(9) < 1
and non-increasing in 9 for 9
€
[#*,#**], and with probability D(9) — for 9 > 9**
.
The proof is in five steps: Steps 1 and 2 characterize the thresholds 9* , 9**, and x*\ Step 3
examines the behavior of the bank; Step 4 examines the beliefs and the strategy of the speculators;
Step 5 establishes robustness in the sense of Definition 2.
Step 1. Let r* = min7?.* > r and f* = max TV < r. Define
U(9)
max {-C(r)} if 9 < 9,
r£\r* ,r"]
max {9$(r)-C{r)} if 9
€ [0,9],
re[r*,?*]
max {9- (l - $(r))# (i=2) - C(r)\ if 9 > 0,
and r(9) as the corresponding argmax . Note that maximizing over [r*, r*] is equivalent to maximiz-
ing over 7Z* as necessarily r(9)
€
TV''. Note also that U(9) is non-decreasing for all 9, and strictly
increasing whenever 0(9) > -C(r*). Moreover, 0(9) = -C(r*) < and G(9MS ) > 9MS ~ C(r*) >
Oms ~ C(r) = 0. Therefore, there exists a unique 9* G (9,9MS ) such that 0(9*) = 0, 0(9) < for
all 9 < 9\ and 0(9) > for all 9 > 9*.
Step 2. For any 9 >9*, define the functions x (9; 9*) and v(9; 9*) as follows
'
'"'
"
'
' and
.fcn-'-t^'""'-'
Note that dx(6;9*)/d9 G (0,1) and therefore dv(9;9*)/d9 > 1. Note also that for any 6> > 6>*,
* (
:
£ J
""
* as e —> 0. To see this, suppose instead that lime_o ^ (
X
e )
= w for some
w > 0. This can be true only if lim£_o 2 (9; 9*) > 9, in which case# > 9* implies \ime^ox(9;9*) > 9*
and therefore lim£_o \P (
x
'
'
~'~
—
) = 1. But then
(
i-«(aa^)
1 o
n
r
lim < 7 ^ -/- r > = = < -,
e^o|
x
.j. pWl-g'
^ ,
^( x{e-fi*)-o \
J
+ w tt'
which is a contradiction. Consider now the function g(9) — v(9\9*) — U(9). From the envelope
theorem, dU(9)/d9 is bounded above by 1 for any 9 < 9 and hence g(9) is strictly increasing in 9
over this range. Moreover, by definition of x (9; 9*) , we have that \I/ ( ^
—
'-^
J
= ^^ = 9ms and
therefore v(0*;9*) = 8* - 9MS - Since 9* < 9Ms and 0(9*) = 0, we conclude that g(9*) < 0. Next,
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note that for any < 0, 0* and ?() are independent of e, whereas \P ( *'
e
<
—
j
—
> as e —» for
every 9 > 9" . (See the argument above). Since 9 > 9* and C(r(9)) > 0, it follows that there exists
e > such that * [
*(W)-g
] < C(?(9)) whenever e < e. But then u(0;0*) > - C(r(9)) > 0(9)
and therefore g{9) > 0. We conclude that, for e < e, there exists a unique 0** 6 {9*, 9) such that
5(0**) = 0, g{9) < for 9 < 9*% and p(0) > for > 9**. Moreover, note that, as e -> 0,
u(0; (9*) —^ 6» > £/(0) for every > 0*; it follows that 9** -> 0* as e -> 0. Next, let
x* = £(0**;0*) and U{9;9*) = 9-9
Compare now 17(0; 0*) with v(0;0*). That £ (0**; 0*) == x* implies U(9**;9*) = u(0**;0*), while the
fact that x(0;0*) is increasing in implies U{9;9*) < v(0;0*) for all 9 < 0** and c/(0;0*) > f(0;0*)
for all > 0**. Combining this result with the properties of the function <?(0), we conclude that
17(0; 0*) < u(0;0*) < U{9) for all 6 < 0**, (7(0; 0*) = ,;(0;0*) = U{9) at = 0**, and t>(0;0*) >
v(0;0*) > U{9) for all > 0**. Finally, let be the unique solution to c/(0;0*) = and note that
0G (0*,0**), since l>(0**;0*) >0> t/(0*;0*).
Step 3. Consider now the behavior of the bank. Given the strategy of the speculators, the bank
prefers r to any r < r*, and r* to any r > r* . Furthermore, by definition, r(0) dominates any
r G [r*,r*]. We thus need to compare only the payoff from playing r(0) with that from playing
r. Playing f(0) yields 0(9), while playing r yields U(9) = max{0, f>(0; 0*)}. Note that U(9) =
if < and f7(0) = t/(0) > if > G (0*,0**). It follows that t/(0) < = [/(0) for all
< 0*, C/(0) > = U(9) for all G (0*,0], t/(0) > t/(0) = U(9) > for all G (0,0**), and
U{9) = 0(9) > 0(9) for all > 0**. Therefore, it is indeed optimal for the bank to play r(9)
whenever G [0*,0**] and r otherwise. The resulting probability of devaluation is 7>(0) = 1 for
<0*, D(9) = $(f(0)) G [0, l)for0G [0*,0**], and D(9) = for > 0**. Since? is non-decreasing,
D is non-increasing in the range [0*,0**].
Step 4. Consider next the behavior of the speculators. For any r < r*, devaluation occurs if and
only if < 0. In equilibrium, at r — r, the probability of devaluation is given by
1-9 (*=£)
fj,(9 < 6\x,r) = ii (6 <0*|x,r) -
By construction, x* solves 7r/i(0 < 9\x* ,r) = r, and since /.i(9 < 0|x,r) is decreasing in x, attacking
the currency if and only if x < x* is indeed optimal. For any out-of-equilibrium r < r*, we consider
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beliefs [i such that n(9 < 6\x,r) is non-increasing in x and ivii{9 < 0\x,r) = r at x = x* . For
any r > r*, we let /j,(0 G (9,9)\x,r) — 1 for all x G [x,x], /x(0 < 9\x,r) = 1 for a; < x, and
/u(# > 9\x,r) = 1 for x > x. In particular, for any r G r(0) with r > r*, fi(9 G 0~ l (r)\x,r) = 1
for all x such that 6(x) D 9~ (r) 7^ 0, where 9~ (r) = {0 : r{9) = r} . In addition, for any out-
of-equilibrium r, if r is not dominated in equilibrium by r(#) for some 9 G 0(x), then we further
restrict \i to satisfy fi(9\x, r) — for all 9 G ©(x) such that 9 — C(r) < U(9). These beliefs satisfy
(4), as well as /./, G A4(r)\ and given these beliefs, the strategy of the speculators is sequentially
optimal for any r and x.
Step 5. Finally, consider robustness. Assume ^ has bounded support, let e be sufficiently small,
and construct the corresponding sunspot equilibrium as above. Let a* = a(9*,r) = ty ( x
~ e
j
and a** = a{9**,r) = * f 5^11 ) and note that < a** < a* < 1. Similarly, let f = *-x (a*)
and £** = ^ _1 (q**) and note that £** < £*. Hence, one can always find a k > such that
< *(£** - k) < #(£* + fc) < 1, and a c.d.f. F with unbounded support such that F{£) - *(£)
for all £ G [r* - k,C + k], F(0 > tf (f) for all £<£**- fc, and F(f) < #(£) for all £ > £* + A;.
We argue that the same r(#) and £>(#) that is sustained when the noise distribution is ty, can
also be sustained when the distribution is F. Indeed, consider the functions U,r,x,v,g,U, and U
defined above, where ty is replaced with F. Note that U{9) and r(9) are independent of the noise
distribution for all 9 < 9. It follows that the same 9* continues to solve U(9*) = 0. By construction
of F, the functions x (9; 9*) , v{9\9*), and g{9) remain the same in a neighborhood of 9** . It follows
that the same 9** and x* continue to solve g{9**) = and x* = x (0**; 9*) . But then U{0; 0*) and
U_{0) also remain the same in a neighborhood of 9**. Since U(9) is also the same for all 9 < 9, and
0** < 0, we infer U{0**) = U{9**;9*) = U{9**). Like in Step 3 above, the latter ensures that the
optimal policy is r{9) = r(0) for all G [0* ,0**} and r(0) = r otherwise. Since r(0) is also the
same for all G [#*,#**], this proves that the same policy r(0) can be sustained with either ^ or F.
Similarly, all < 0* continue to devalue with certainty and all > 9** continue to maintain the peg
with certainty, while for 9 G [#*,#**] the probability of devaluation is D{9) = 5>(f(0)). Therefore,
the same devaluation probability D(9) can also be sustained with either $ or F. A symmetric
argument applies if ^ is unbounded. With £* and £** defined as above, take an arbitrary k >
and construct F so that F has bounded support [£** — 2k, £* + 2k] and satisfies F(£) — ^(0 for
all £ G [f* - k,C + k], F(f) < *(0 for all £<£**- k, and F(f) > *(£) for all £ > C* - k. It
follows that F sustains the same r{9) and D{9) as <!». We conclude that the sunspot equilibria of
Proposition 5 are robust.
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Figure 1
There exists an inactive policy equilibrium in which the central bank sets r for all 8, the size of the
attack is a(Q,r), and devaluation occurs if and only if < M s- Any r'e(r,r] is dominated in
equilibrium by r if and only if C{r r) > 9 or C{r r) > a(Q,r), that is, if and only if 0g [0',0"]. It follows
that, for any 0e [0',0"], if the central bank deviates from r to r\ the market "learns" that 0e [G',6"]-
Speculators then coordinate on the same behavior as when r = r, thus eliminating any incentive for
the bank to raise the interest rate.
Figure 2
For each re (r,r], there is a two-threshold equilibrium in which the interest rate is r(Q) = r" if
9 e [9 , 9 ] and r(9) = r otherwise, and in which devaluation occurs if and only if 9 < 9*. When the
central bank raises the interest rate at r, the market "learns" that 9 e [9*, 9**] and coordinates on no
attack. When instead the bank sets r, speculators attack if and only if their signal is sufficiently low, in
which case the size of the attack is decreasing in 9. It follows that it is optimal for the central bank to
raise the interest rate at r if and only if C(r') < 9 and C(r') < a(B,r), that is, if and only if 9 e [9*, 9**].
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